Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations

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Page 1

Final Coordination (2)

15 March 2005

Doctrine for

Joint Nuclear Operations

Joint Publication 3-12

Page 2

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides guidelines for the joint employment of forces in nuclear

operations. It provides guidance for the employment of US nuclear forces; command and

control relationships; and weapons effect considerations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the

Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and

other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and

training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their

appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC

from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most

appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of

combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components

of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances

dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the

contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance.

Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military

command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United

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Preface

JP 3-12

States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should

evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where

applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

NORTON A. SCHWARTZ

Lieutenant General, USAF

Director, Joint Staff

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-12, DATED 15 DECEMBER 1995

•

iii

Contains discussion of both strategic and theater and nuclear operations

Covers the purpose of United States nuclear forces

Revises the discussion of nuclear weapons use across the range of military

operations

Provides an updated and expanded discussion of nuclear operations

Introduces the joint targeting cycle process to nuclear operations

Updates employment and force integration considerations

Adds an entire chapter on theater nuclear operations

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Summary of Changes

JP 3-12

Intentionally Blank

Page 6

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................ vii

CHAPTER I

NUCLEAR FORCE FUNDAMENTALS

•

Nuclear Force Purpose and Principles................................................................................... I-1

•

Fundamental Considerations ................................................................................................. I-6

•

Range of Military Operations ............................................................................................. I-10

CHAPTER II

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

•

Introduction ........................................................................................................................... II-1

•

Command Relationships, Command and Control, and Command

Responsibilities .................................................................................................................. II-1

•

Integrated Planning and Targeting ....................................................................................... II-3

•

Employment and Force Integration ..................................................................................... II-8

•

Combat Readiness .............................................................................................................. II-12

•

Continued Operations After Nuclear Weapons Use ......................................................... II-13

CHAPTER III

THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

•

The Role of US Theater Nuclear Operations ..................................................................... III-1

•

Theater Nuclear Support Forces ........................................................................................ III-3

•

Command, Control and Coordination ............................................................................... III-3

•

Planning .............................................................................................................................. III-5

APPENDIX

A References ...................................................................................................................... A-1

B Administrative Instructions ........................................................................................... B-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .............................................................................. GL-1

Part II Terms and Definitions .......................................................................................... GL-3

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Table of Contents

JP 3-12

FIGURE

I-1

The New Triad .......................................................................................................... I-4

I-2

Deterrence Challenges: What the Opposing Actor Must Believe.......................... I-7

I-3

Summary of US Treaty Limitations on Nuclear Weapons ................................... I-10

I-4

Nuclear Forces and Strategy Evaluation Criteria .................................................. I-11

I-5

Wartime Considerations ......................................................................................... I-12

I-6

Mitigation ............................................................................................................... I-14

I-7

Post Wartime Considerations ................................................................................. I-15

II-1

Critical Elements of Nuclear Operations ................................................................ II-1

II-2

Joint Targeting Cycle Phases .................................................................................. II-4

II-3

Target Planning Considerations .............................................................................. II-5

II-4

Planning Considerations ........................................................................................ II-10

II-5

Strategic Nuclear Forces........................................................................................ II-13

III-1 Theater Planning Support Process ........................................................................ III-6

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

•

vii

Covers Nuclear Force Fundamentals

Discusses Nuclear Operations

Covers Theater Nuclear Operations

Nuclear Force Purpose and Principles

The US defense strategy

serves the national

objective of peace with

prosperity.

2001 Nuclear Posture

Review.

The new triad.

The US defense strategy aims to achieve four key goals that

guide the development of US forces capabilities, their

development and use: assuring allies and friends of the US

steadfastness of purpose and its capability to fulfill its security

commitment; dissuading adversaries from undertaking

programs or operations that could threaten US interests or those

of our allies and friends; deterring aggression and coercion by

deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and

imposing sever penalties for aggression on an adversary’s military

capability and supporting infrastructure; and, decisively defeating

an adversary if deterrence fails.

The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) constituted the first

comprehensive review of nuclear forces since 1994. Because of

the critical role played by US nuclear forces in the national security

strategy of the United States and its allies, the report was broader

in scope than required by law. In a significant change to the US

approach to offensive nuclear weapons, the 2001 NPR articulated

a new capabilities-based strategyfor US strategic nuclear forces

that recognizes the unpredictable security environment and

responds to US strategic deterrence objectives and force capability

requirements.

The new triad offers a mix of strategic offensive and defensive

capabilities that includes nuclear and nonnuclear strike

capabilities, active and passive defenses, and a robust research,

development, and industrial infrastructure to develop, build, and

maintain offensive forces and defensive systems. Enhanced

command and control (C2), intelligence, and adaptive planning

capabilities support the new triad. The new triad provides a deterrence

posture suitable for the emerging threat environment; it incorporates

post-Cold War advances in defensive and nonnuclear capabilities;

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Executive Summary

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Fundamental Considerations

and, it provides additional military options that are credible to

adversaries and reassuring to allies.

Strategic deterrence is defined as the prevention of adversary

aggression or coercion that threatens vital interests of the United

States and/or our national survival. Strategic deterrence

convinces adversaries not to take grievous courses of action

by means of decisive influence over their decision making.

Deterrence broadly represents the manifestation of a potential

adversary’s decision to forego actions that he would otherwise

attempt. Diplomatically, the central focus of deterrence is for

one nation to exert such influence over a potential adversary’s

decision-making process that the potential adversary makes a

deliberate choice to refrain from a course of action. The focus of

US deterrence efforts is therefore to influence potential

adversaries to withhold actions intended to harm US’ national

interests. Such a decision is based on the adversary’s perception

of the benefits of various courses of action compared with an

estimation of the likelihood and magnitude of the costs or

consequences corresponding to these courses of action. It is these

adversary perceptions and estimations that US deterrent actions

seek to influence. Potential adversary decision making in the

face of US deterrent actions is also influenced by their strategic

culture, idiosyncrasies of decision mechanisms and the leader’s

decision style, and leadership risk tolerance.

The US does not make positive statements defining the

circumstances under which it would use nuclear weapons.

Maintaining US ambiguity about when it would use nuclear

weapons helps create doubt in the minds of potential adversaries,

deterring them from taking hostile action. This calculated

ambiguity helps reinforce deterrence. If the US clearly defined

conditions under which it would use nuclear weapons, others

might infer another set of circumstances in which the US would

not use nuclear weapons. This perception would increase the

chances that hostile leaders might not be deterred from taking

actions they perceive as falling below that threshold.

Real force capabilities, US national determination to use them,

and a potential adversary’s perception of both the capabilities

and the will to use them contribute to the effectiveness

deterrence. Tofulfill this purpose, US military forces are capable

Deterrence.

Declaratory Policy.

Force Capabilities.

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Executive Summary

Implementing National

Military Strategy.

International Reaction.

The Law of Armed

Conflict.

of achieving US national objectives throughout the range of military

operations. Although the United States may not know with confidence

what threats a state, combinations of states, or nonstate actors pose to

US interests, it is possible to anticipate the capabilities an adversary

might use. Developing and sustaining a modern and diverse portfolio

of military capabilities serves the four key defense policy goals, identified

earlier, that guide the development, deployment, and use of military

forces and capabilities, including nuclear forces.

The decision to employ nuclearweapons at any level requires

explicit orders from the President. Senior commanders make

recommendations affecting nuclear policy decisions on force

structure, weapon and force capabilities, and alternative

employment options. The use of nuclear weapons represents a

significant escalation from conventional warfare and may be

provoked by some action, event, or threat. However, like any

military action, the decision to use nuclear weapons is driven

by the political objective sought. This choice involves many

political considerations, all of which impact nuclear weapon use,

the types and number of weapons used, and method of

employment.

International reaction toward the country or nonstate entity that

first employs weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is an important

political consideration. The United States and its allies articulated

their abhorrence of unrestricted warfare by codifying “laws of

war,” and turning to definitions of “just war.” The tremendous

destructive capability of WMD and the consequences of their

use resulted in a number of agreements restricting deployment

and use. Nevertheless, while the belligerent that initiates nuclear

warfare may find itself the target of world condemnation, no

customary orconventional international law prohibits nations

from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict.

The principle of proportionality requires that the anticipated

loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property incidental to

attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct

military advantage expected to be gained. Commanders therefore

have the responsibility to attempt to minimize collateral damage

to the greatest extent practicable. The law of armed conflict

does not prohibit nuclear weapons use in armed conflict

although they are unique from conventional and even other WMD

in the scope of their destructive potential and long-term effects.

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Nuclear Operations

The critical elements ofstrategic and theater nuclear operations include

detailed command relationships, commandresponsibilities, and C2 actions;

integrated planning and targeting; employment and force integration;

and combat readiness.

National policy requires a single execution and termination

authority for the use of nuclear weapons. The President retains

sole authority for the employment and termination of nuclear

weapons. The pace of modern war dictates streamlined and

efficient methods of C2. The President and Secretary of Defense

must have the most current and available situational information

and intelligence and must comprehend all strategic and theater

nuclear plans and options. Top-down communication

transmitted over reliable, secure, and survivable

communications systems ensures critical orders are received

for execution, increases survivability, and reduces vulnerability

of C2 systems across the range of military operations. The

Commander, US Strategic Command, has combatant

command (command authority) over selected portions of the

nation’s strategic nuclear forces and is responsible for the

planning and execution of strategic nuclear operations.

Circumstantially, geographic combatant commanders may be

assigned operational control over US Strategic Command nuclear-

capable forces employed for nuclear operations in support of

theater conflicts.

Detailed planning is key to the execution of strategic nuclear

operations. The President, Secretary of State, and Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff each provide guidance for nuclear weapon

planning. An integrated operation plan or series of plans

predicated on commonly agreed strategic objectives is an absolute

prerequisite to unity of force and strategic nuclear operations

execution. This plan or series of plans formalizes the integration

of nuclear assets. They clarify command guidance and objectives,

effectively assign and prioritize targets, and synchronize

execution.

Strategic operational planning must include the ability to respond

to new targets and changing priorities before or during the

execution of strategic nuclear operations. This adaptive planning

capabilityensures the most efficient use of resources and that strategic

forces are fully capable of responding to any new threats that might

There are four critical

elements of strategic and

theater nuclear

operations.

Detailed command

relationships, command

responsibilities, and

command and control

actions.

Integrated planning and

targeting.

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Executive Summary

arise. Strategic planners must also be prepared to conduct crisis

action planningin those cases where adaptable, deliberate plans do

not exist.

Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and

matching the appropriate response to them, taking into account

operational requirements and capabilities. As nonnuclear strike

capabilities and nuclear strike are integrated, targets that may

have required a nuclear weapon to achieve the needed effects in

previous planning may be targeted with conventional weapons,

provided the required effects can be achieved.

Whether supporting national strategic goals or geographic

combatant commanders, the nuclear targeting process is

cyclical. The process begins with guidance and priorities issued

by the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and culminates with the final step of combat

assessment. The entire targeting process consists of six phases:

commander’s objectives, guidance, and intent; target

development, validation, nomination, and prioritization;

capabilities analysis; commander’s decision and force

assignment; mission planning and force execution; and, combat

assessment.

For many contingencies, existing and emerging conventional

capabilities will meet anticipated requirements; however, some

contingencies will remain where the most appropriate response

may include the use of US nuclear weapons. Integrating

conventional and nuclearattacks will ensure the most efficient

use of force and provide US leaders with a broader range of strike

options to address immediate contingencies. Integration of

conventional and nuclear forces is therefore crucial to the success

of any comprehensive strategy. This integration will ensure

optimal targeting, minimal collateral damage, and reduce the

probability of escalation.

Basic employment considerations are closely tied to the capabilities of

assigned nuclear forces(i.e., weapons, delivery systems, and supporting

systems under the combatant command (command authority) of

Commander, United States Strategic Command

(CDRUSSTRATCOM) and operational control of the geographic

combatant commanders). Each leg of the nuclear triad offers

characteristics that collectively provide a wide range of employment

capabilities such as flexibility, effectiveness, survivability, and

responsiveness.

Employment and force

integration.

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Tomaintain their deterrent effect, US nuclear forces must maintain a

strong and visible state of readiness. Strategic nuclear force

readiness levels are categorized as either operationally deployed

or as part of the responsive capability. US Operationally Deployed

Strategic Nuclear Warheads will be limited to 1,700 to 2,200 by 2012.

The remaining US strategic nuclear weapons remain in storage and

serve as an augmentation capability should US strategic nuclear force

requirements rise above the levels of the Moscow Treaty.

Theater nuclear support may be provided by a geographic

combatant commander’sassigned forces, United States Strategic

Command (USSTRATCOM), or from a supporting combatant

commander. Weapons in the US nuclear arsenal include:

gravity bombs and cruise missiles deliverable by Dual Capable

Aircraft and long-range bombers; the Tomahawk Land Attack

Missile/Nuclear deliverable by attack submarines; submarine-

launched ballistic missiles; and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

These systems provide the President and the geographic

combatant commander with a wide range of options that can be

tailored to meet desired military and political objectives.

The geographic combatant commander is responsible for

requesting nuclear support. The commander must ascertain

the military situation, assess intelligence inputs, pass information

and conclusions to higher levels of command, and upon receipt

of execution instructions, control assigned forces to achieve the

desired objectives. Subordinate commanders responsible for

target nominations submit requests to the geographic combatant

commander. Execution procedures are flexible and allow for

changes in the situation. Commanders will ensure that constraints

and release guidance are clearly understood. The commander

controlling the nuclear strike package must maintain

communications with the delivery unit and establish a chain of

succession that maintains connectivity in case of headquarters

destruction.

When directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, joint

force commanders (JFCs) plan for nuclear weapon

employment in a manner consistent with national policy and

strategic guidance. Geographic combatant commanders are

responsible for defining theater objectives and developing nuclear

plans required to support those objectives, including selecting

targets. When tasked, CDRUSSTRATCOM, as a supporting

Combat readiness.

Theater nuclear support

forces.

Command and control.

Planning.

Theater Nuclear Operations

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Executive Summary

CONCLUSION

combatant commander, provides detailed planning support to meet

theater planning requirements. All theater nuclear option planning

follows prescribed Joint Operation Planning and Execution

System procedures to formulate and implement an effective

response within the timeframe permitted by the crisis. Since

options do not exist for every scenario, combatant commanders

must have a capability to perform crisis action planning and

execute those plans. Crisis action planning provides the capability

to develop new options, or modify existing options, when current

limited or major response options are inappropriate. The

supported commander defines the desired operational effects, and

with USSTRATCOM assistance, develops Theater Nuclear

Options to achieve those effects (e.g., disrupt, delay, disable, or

destroy).

Nuclear weapons and associated systems may be deployed into

theaters, but combatant commanders have no authority to employ

them until that authority is specifically granted by the President.

This publication outlines military guidance for the exercise of authority

by combatant commanders and other JFCs. It prescribes doctrine

for joint nuclear planning, operations, and training and serves as a

reference to more definitive and classified guidance. US nuclear forces

deter potential adversary use of WMD and dissuade against a potential

adversary’s development of an overwhelming conventional threat. The

decision to employ nuclear weapons at any level requires the explicit

decision from the President.

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Intentionally Blank

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I-1

CHAPTER I

NUCLEAR FORCE FUNDAMENTALS

1. Nuclear Force Purpose and Principles

a. Purpose of United States Nuclear Forces

(1) The US defense strategy serves the national objective of peace with

prosperity. The strategy aims to achieve four key goals that guide the development of US

force capabilities, their development and use:

(a) Assuring allies and friends of the US steadfastness of purpose and its

capability to fulfill its security commitments.

(b) Dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that

could threaten US interests or those of our allies and friends.

swiftly defeat attacks and imposing severe penalties for aggression on an adversary’s

military capability and supporting infrastructure.

(d) Decisively defeating an adversary if deterrence fails.

(2) The size, composition, and readiness posture of US nuclear forces contribute

to each of these four goals.

(a) Assurance. US nuclear forces assure our friends and allies by

remaining available for the President to employ should he determine that a threat to a

friend or ally warrants a potential nuclear response.

(b) Dissuasion. US nuclear forces dissuade potential adversaries by being

so numerous, advanced, and reliable that the US retains an unassailable edge for the

foreseeable future.

the President the means to respond appropriately to an attack on the US, its friends or

allies. US nuclear forces must be capable of, and be seen to be capable of, destroying

“The nature of the Cold War threat required the United States — with our allies

and friends — to emphasize deterrence of the enemy’s use of force, producing a

grim strategy of mutual assured destruction. With the collapse of the Soviet Union

and the end of the Cold War, our security environment has undergone profound

transformation.”

The National Security Strategy of the United States,

September 2002

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Chapter I

I-2

JP 3-12

those critical war-making and war-supporting assets and capabilities that a potential

adversary leadership values most and that it would rely on to achieve its own objectives

in a post-war world. Thus, US nuclear forces deter potential adversary use of weapons of

mass destruction (WMD) and dissuade against a potential adversary’s development of an

overwhelming conventional threat.

(d) Defeat. US nuclear forces provide the means to apply overwhelming

force to a broad range of targets in a time and manner chosen by the President.

b. Nuclear Policy. National Security Presidential Directive-14 lays out

Presidential nuclear weapons planning guidance. It provides broad overarching guidance

for nuclear weapon planning. National Security Presidential Directive-28 provides

Presidential guidance on the command and control (C2), safety, and security of nuclear

weapons. The Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons is a Secretary

of Defense document that implements Presidential guidance. The Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan (JSCP) Nuclear Supplement, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Iinstruction (CJCSI) 3110.04B, Nuclear Supplement to JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities

Plan for FY05 (U), provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS’s)

guidance to the combatant commanders and Service Chiefs for preparing and

coordinating plans to deploy and employ nuclear weapons.

c. 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The following laws required the

Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct a comprehensive review of the US nuclear

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles deter potential aggressors from initiating an

attack and remain deployed and ready should deterrence fail.

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Nuclear Force Fundamentals

1-3

posture and develop a long-range plan to sustain and modernize US strategic nuclear

forces in order to counter emerging threats and satisfy evolving deterrence requirements.

(1) Section 1041 and 1042 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 (Public Law 106-398).

(2) Section 1033 of the FY 2002 Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 107-

107).

d. The 2001 NPR constituted the first comprehensive review of nuclear forces since

1994. Because of the critical role played by US nuclear forces in the national security

strategy of the United States and its allies, the report was broader in scope than required

by law. Conducted in parallel with the Quadrennial Defense Review - 2001 (QDR-

2001), the 2001 NPR reflected the strategic premises of the QDR-2001. In a significant

change to the US approach to offensive nuclear weapons, the 2001 NPR articulated a new

capabilities-based strategy for US strategic nuclear forces that recognizes the

unpredictable security environment and responds to US strategic deterrence objectives

and force capability requirements.

Note: The 1994 NPR focused on the strategic nuclear force structure which would have

been deployed under the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), which

was never ratified. “START II: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Executive Summary,”

Internet available at http://www.defenselink.mil/acq/acic/treaties/start2/st2_es.htm.

(1) Capabilities-Based Forces. Under the capabilities-based approach to

planning, the United States will reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear

warheads to a range of 1,700 to 2,200. This range establishes the lowest possible number

consistent with national security requirements and alliance obligations while maintaining

a level that provides a credible deterrent. The weapons retained in a non-deployed status

will preserve the ability to respond to deterioration in the international security

environment if necessary. The NPR established an initial approach to reduce

operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces, outlined plans to sustain and modernize

existing nuclear force structure, and defined a new triad of strategic capabilities.

(2) Mix of Strategic Capabilities. The new triad offers a mix of strategic

offensive and defensive capabilities that includes nuclear and nonnuclear strike

capabilities, active and passive defenses, and a robust research, development, and

industrial infrastructure to develop, build, and maintain offensive forces and defensive

systems (see Figure I-1). Enhanced C2, intelligence, and adaptive planning capabilities

support the new triad. The new triad provides a deterrence posture suitable for the

emerging threat environment; it incorporates post-Cold War advances in defensive and

nonnuclear capabilities; and, it provides additional military options that are credible to

adversaries and reassuring to allies.

(a) Strike Capabilities. Nonnuclear strike capabilities include advanced

conventional weapons systems (long-range, precision-guided weapons and associated

delivery means), offensive information operations, and special operations forces which

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Chapter I

I-4

JP 3-12

can be used to hunt for mobile missiles or operate against WMD facilities. Deployed

nuclear strike capabilities include the three legs of the existing strategic nuclear triad

(intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs], submarine-launches ballistic missiles

[SLBMs], and bombers) and theater-based, nuclear-capable dual-role aircraft. Nuclear-

armed sea-launched cruise missiles, removed from ships and submarines under the 1991

Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, are secured in central areas where they remain available,

if necessary.

(b) Defenses. Active defenses include missile and air defenses. Passive

defenses include measures that reduce vulnerability through operations security,

communications, security, emission security, physical security, mobility, dispersal,

redundancy, deception, concealment, and hardening. Passive defenses warn of imminent

attack, support consequence management activities that mitigate the damage caused by

WMD use, and protect critical information systems. This element of the new triad

comprises defenses for the US homeland, forces abroad, allies, and friends.

1. The research and development and industrial infrastructure includes

the research facilities, manufacturing capacity, and skilled personnel needed to produce,

sustain, and modernize the elements of the new triad as well as supporting intelligence

Cold War Triad

New Triad

Nonnuclear and Nuclear

Strike Capabilities

ICBMs

Bombers

SLBMs

ICBMs

Bombers

SLBMs

C2, Intelligence,

Planning

Responsive

Infrastructure

Active and

Passive Defenses

C2: Command and Control

ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

SLBM: Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile

THE NEW TRIAD

Figure I-1. The New Triad

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Nuclear Force Fundamentals

1-5

and C2 capabilities.

2. A responsive infrastructure that can augment US military capabilities

through the development of new systems or accelerated production of existing

capabilities in a timely manner provides strategic depth to the new triad. In particular, a

secure, modern, responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure is indispensable, especially as

the size of the operationally deployed nuclear arsenal is reduced.

(3) The New Triad and the Defense Policy Goals. The new triad provides the

United States with a broad array of options to address a wide range of possible

contingencies, and serves the four primary defense policy goals defined in the QDR-

2001:

(a) Assuring allies and friends.

(b) Dissuading future military competition.

(d) If deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary.

(4) New Thinking for a New Era. In a major break from Cold War thinking,

the results of the 2001 NPR reflect the capabilities required of nuclear forces in the new

strategic environment. This approach allows the United States to take the lead in

reducing nuclear stockpiles rather than rely on protracted arms control negotiations. The

NPR outlines implications for various arms control treaty regimes, underscores the need

for a new cooperative approach to Russia, and establishes a new strategic framework

more consistent with the post-Cold War relationship between the two countries.

Terrorists or rogue regional states armed with WMD will likely test US security

commitments to its allies and friends. In response, the US needs a range of capabilities to

assure friend and foe alike of its resolve. A broader array of capability is needed to

dissuade states from undertaking diplomatic, political, military, or technical courses of

action (COAs) that would threaten US and allied security. US forces must pose a

credible deterrent to potential adversaries who have access to modern military

technology, including WMD and the means to deliver them.

(5) Sustaining and Modernizing Nuclear Forces.

Lastly, the NPR

summarized DOD plans to sustain and modernize the existing US nuclear force structure.

It outlined estimated required weapon systems replacement dates and planned for the next

generation of nuclear systems. Under the requirements of the NPR, the United States will

maintain a force structure that simultaneously complies with START limits and limits

operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODSNW) to 1,700 - 2,200 by 2012.

The ODSNW total is a result of the May 2002 Treaty Between the United States of

America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (The Moscow

Treaty). It is important to note that the Moscow Treaty and START are separate. The

START provisions do not extend to the Moscow Treaty, and the Moscow Treaty does not

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terminate, extend or in any other way affect the status of START. START will remain in

effect until December 5, 2009 unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement or

extended. The NPR fulfilled the need for a new approach to nuclear forces planning, one

that will enable the United States to meet the myriad threats and challenges of the new

strategic environment. It provides a roadmap that outlines the future of US nuclear

capabilities and puts forward a new framework for national security in the 21st century.

2. Fundamental Considerations

a. Deterrence

(1) Strategic Deterrence is defined as the prevention of adversary aggression or

coercion that threatens vital interests of the United States and/or our national survival.

Strategic deterrence convinces adversaries not to take grievous COAs by means of

decisive influence over their decision making. [Note: Strategic Deterrence Joint

Operating Concept, November 2004, p8.]

(2) Deterrence broadly represents the manifestation of a potential adversary’s

decision to forego actions that he would otherwise attempt. Diplomatically, the central

focus of deterrence is for one nation to exert such influence over a potential adversary’s

decision-making process that the potential adversary makes a deliberate choice to refrain

from a COA. The focus of US deterrence efforts is therefore to influence potential

adversaries to withhold actions intended to harm US’ national interests. Such a decision

is based on the adversary’s perception of the benefits of various COAs compared with an

estimation of the likelihood and magnitude of the costs or consequences corresponding to

these COAs. It is these adversary perceptions and estimations that US deterrent actions

seek to influence. Potential adversary decision making in the face of US deterrent actions

is also influenced by their strategic culture, idiosyncrasies of decision mechanisms and

the leader’s decision style, and leadership risk tolerance.

(3) The effectiveness of deterrence depends on how a potential adversary views

US capabilities and its will to use those capabilities. If a potential adversary is convinced

that US forces can deny them their goals (by damage to their military, its support, or

other things of value); and if that perception leads the potential adversary to limit their

actions, then deterrence is effective. Deterrence of potential adversary WMD use

requires the potential adversary leadership to believe the United States has both the

ability and will to preempt or retaliate promptly with responses that are credible and

effective.

(4) Deterrence assumes an opposing actor’s leadership proceeds according to the

logic of self-interest, although this self-interest is viewed from differing cultural

perspectives and the dictates of given situations. This will be particularly difficult with

nonstate actors who employ or attempt to gain use of WMD. Here deterrence may be

directed at states that support their efforts as well as the terrorist organization itself.

However, the continuing proliferation of WMD along with the means to deliver them

increases the probability that someday a state/nonstate actor nation/terrorist may, through

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miscalculation or by deliberate choice, use those weapons. In such cases, deterrence,

even based on the threat of massive destruction, may fail and the United States must be

prepared to use nuclear weapons if necessary. A major challenge of deterrence is

therefore to convincingly convey both will and capability to the opposing actor.

(5) Figure I-2 lists the most prominent deterrence challenges in a 2003 strategic

deterrence requirements study commissioned by the Joint Requirements Oversight

Council for the Joint Staff.

b. Declaratory Policy

(1) The US does not make positive statements defining the circumstances under

which it would use nuclear weapons. Maintaining US ambiguity about when it would

use nuclear weapons helps create doubt in the minds of potential adversaries, deterring

them from taking hostile action. This calculated ambiguity helps reinforce deterrence. If

the US clearly defined conditions under which it would use nuclear weapons, others

might infer another set of circumstances in which the US would not use nuclear weapons.

This perception would increase the chances that hostile leaders might not be deterred

from taking actions they perceive as falling below that threshold.

(2) In the past, when North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) faced large

Warsaw Pact conventional forces, the US repeatedly rejected calls for adoption of a ‘no

first use’ policy of nuclear weapons, since this policy could undermine deterrence. The

US countered such calls by stating that it would not be the first to use force (vice nuclear

force).

DETERRENCE CHALLENGES:

WHAT THE OPPOSING ACTOR MUST BELIEVE

Costs of escalation will be severe, exceeding the negative consequences of restraint

US can/will effectively deploy power projection forces despite weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) use

US stake in conflict is high, political will is strong

US can counter aggression across the spectrum of conflict

US can effectively protect its allies from attack

WMD use will bolster rather than undermine US resolve

US will not be deterred by WMD threat/use, and is willing to risk escalation

US WMD defenses of its forces, population, and critical assets are effective

Transfer of WMD to terrorists will be detected and attributed

WMD use will result in severe personal consequences

WMD use will be attributed to those responsible in a timely way

They have something left to lose

Figure I-2. Deterrence Challenges: What the Opposing Actor Must Believe

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(3) The US declaratory policy also supports its nonproliferation objectives. The

US has made policy statements and binding commitments in the nonproliferation context

that may seem to create tension with its desire to enhance deterrence through ambiguity.

The US policy of Negative Security Assurance responds to that apparent tension and

ensures that there is no contradiction in US policy. The US continues to reaffirm its 1978

Negative Security Assurances which state: “The US will not use nuclear weapons against

nonnuclear weapon states party to the Nonproliferation Treaty except in the case of an

invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other

troops, its allies, or on a state toward which it has a security commitment, carried out or

sustained by such a nonnuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-

weapon state.”

c. Force Capabilities. Real force capabilities, US national determination to use

them, and a potential adversary’s perception of both the capabilities and the will to use

them contribute to the effectiveness of deterrence. To fulfill this purpose, US military

forces are capable of achieving US national objectives throughout the range of military

operations. Although the United States may not know with confidence what threats a

state, combinations of states, or nonstate actors pose to US interests, it is possible to

anticipate the capabilities an adversary might use. Developing and sustaining a modern

and diverse portfolio of military capabilities serves the four key defense policy goals,

identified earlier, that guide the development, deployment, and use of military forces and

capabilities, including nuclear forces. These capabilities require maintaining a diverse

mix of conventional forces capable of high-intensity, sustained, and coordinated actions

across the range of military operations; employed in concert with survivable and secure

nuclear forces; and the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems required to inform and direct these

Bombers provide a flexible and recallable nuclear capability, which is

essential in escalation management.

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forces. For deterrence to be effective, the force mixture must hold at risk those assets

most valued by adversary leaders and provide a range of options for the US. It is possible,

however, that a potential adversary either may misperceive or choose to disregard the risk

posed by US deterrence actions. Therefore, if deterrence fails, the force mixture must

provide a variety of options designed to control escalation and terminate the conflict on

terms favorable to the United States and its allies.

d. Implementing National Military Strategy. The decision to employ nuclear

weapons at any level requires explicit orders from the President. Senior commanders

make recommendations affecting nuclear policy decisions on force structure, weapon and

force capabilities, and alternative employment options. Consequently, those responsible

for the operational planning and direction of US nuclear forces must fully appreciate the

numerous and complex factors that influence the US nuclear planning process and would

likely shape US decisions on the possible use of nuclear weapons. The use of nuclear

weapons represents a significant escalation from conventional warfare and may be

provoked by some action, event, or threat. However, like any military action, the

decision to use nuclear weapons is driven by the political objective sought. This choice

involves many political considerations, all of which impact nuclear weapon use, the types

and number of weapons used, and method of employment.

e. International Reaction. International reaction toward the country or nonstate

entity that first employs WMD is an important political consideration. The United States

and its allies articulated their abhorrence of unrestricted warfare by codifying “laws of

war,” and turning to definitions of “just war.” The tremendous destructive capability of

WMD and the consequences of their use resulted in a number of agreements (see Figure

I-3, which summarizes US Treaty Limitations on Nuclear Weapons) restricting

deployment and use. Nevertheless, while the belligerent that initiates nuclear warfare

may find itself the target of world condemnation, no customary or conventional

international law prohibits nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict.

f. The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)

(1) The LOAC is a portion of international law that seeks to regulate the conduct

of armed hostilities. The LOAC is primarily derived from generally accepted principles

(customary law) of international law, treaties, and conventions that bind countries under

international law. The LOAC seeks to prevent combatants from unnecessary suffering,

protect noncombatants, safeguard fundamental human rights, and facilitate the restoration

of peace by limiting the amount and type of force, and the manner in which force is

applied. Neither the LOAC nor national policy sanction devastation as an end in itself.

Both recognize the necessity of force to achieve legitimate military objectives and to

ensure military advantage.

(2) However, the principle of proportionality requires that the anticipated loss of

civilian life and damage to civilian property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in

relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.

Commanders therefore have the responsibility to attempt to minimize collateral damage

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to the greatest extent practicable. The LOAC does not prohibit nuclear weapons use in

armed conflict although they are unique from conventional and even other WMD in the

scope of their destructive potential and long-term effects.

3. Range of Military Operations

As part of the military instrument of national power, US nuclear forces help deter

massive attacks against the American homeland, contribute to theater deterrence, serve as

a hedge against actions by conventional forces, protect allies, and help assure their

•

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Figure I-3. Summary of US Treaty Limitations on Nuclear Weapons

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Nuclear Force Fundamentals

1-11

security. Because the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict could provoke serious

diplomatic, political, economic, and military consequences; clear allied and potential

adversary understanding of US nuclear weapons policy is essential. This broad range of

possible applications for nuclear weapons use requires that planners and policymakers be

fully aware of the correspondingly broad range of planning considerations that

accompany the decision to use a nuclear weapon.

a. Peacetime and Crisis Considerations

(1) Force Employment. The US must carefully consider nuclear force

survivability, credibility, safety, and security when organizing and employing US nuclear

forces. Moreover, decisions regarding nuclear force structure, deployments, or uses must

accommodate the concerns outlined in Figure I-4.

(2) Conflict Avoidance. Pursuing alternative mechanisms and disincentives to

conflict such as nonproliferation, counterproliferation, arms control and verification, and

confidencebuilding measures during peacetime enhances conflict avoidance. These

measures make conflict or war less likely by improving communication, reducing

opportunities for miscalculation, providing ways to resolve crises, and reducing the

destructive capacity of available arsenals.

(3) Readiness. Increased readiness levels help deter aggression. Consequently,

an increased risk of attack, prompted by adversary war readiness measures, may require

U forces must be able to survive a first strike with sufficient retaliatory

strength to inflict unacceptable damage on an adversary in a counterstrike.

The potential aggressor must believe the United States could and would

use nuclear weapons to attain its security objectives; however, there is a

possibility that an adversary may be willing to risk destruction or

disproportionate losses. In such cases, deterrence, even based on the

threat of massive destruction, may fail.

The risk of failure through accident, unauthorized use, or miscalculation

must be minimized.

Ensure secure manufacture, transportation, and storage to mitigate

terrorist threat and prevent loss, theft, and unauthorized access.

NUCLEAR FORCES AND STRATEGY

EVALUATION CRITERIA

SURVIVABILITY

CREDIBILITY

SAFETY

SECURITY

Figure I-4. Nuclear Forces and Strategy Evaluation Criteria

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US forces to maintain visibly increased states of alert. Delivery system postures can send

a clear warning. Nuclear-capable bombers and submarines deploying to dispersal

locations can send a forceful message that demonstrates the national will to use nuclear

weapons, and increase their survivability. However, the danger also exists that the

adversary may perceive either an exploitable vulnerability or the threat of imminent use.

Accordingly, while the United States signals national resolve through increased readiness

postures, it may also signal the willingness to de-escalate through overt measures.

(4) Crisis. The United States maintains the capability to rapidly posture its

nuclear forces. Nuclear forces are properly generated and managed to ensure a sustained

high level of readiness and survivability. Conventional forces and intelligence activities

require prudent management to avoid inadvertent escalation of the kind that could result

from, for example, erroneous warnings of an adversary’s WMD attack. If the crisis is

successfully resolved without employment of nuclear weapons, reductions in the alert

posture of nuclear forces can send a reinforcing message. This also requires careful

management. US and multinational leaders must also consider potential military

advantages an adversary might gain as US nuclear alert levels are reduced. The

adversary may choose to destabilize the de-escalation effort by exploiting those

advantages.

b. Wartime Considerations (see Figure I-5).

(1) Deterring WMD Use and Conventional Military Operations. Deterrence

of a WMD attack depends on the adversary’s perception of its warfighting capabilities

relative to those of the United States and its allies. However, wartime circumstances may

alter such perceptions. Shifts in the strategic balance may result from military action in

which an adversary suffers significant destruction of its military forces and means of

support. Thus, when an adversary is confronted with overwhelming conventional force

or a prolonged conventional conflict the WMD threshold may be lowered, making WMD

use appear to be the only viable option for regime survival.

WARTIME CONSIDERATIONS

Deterring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) use and conventional

military operations

Deterrence failure

Strike warning

Adversary WMD use

Attrition and escalation

Nuclear effects

Mitigation efforts

Figure I-5. Wartime Considerations

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(2) Deterrence Failure. If deterrence fails, the US objective is to repel or

defeat a military attack and terminate the conflict on terms favorable to the United States

and its allies. Accomplishing this objective requires the capability for measured and

effective response to any level of aggression while seeking to control the intensity, scope

of conflict, and destruction. Specific nuclear objectives and employment plan

development guidance are delineated in the nuclear supplement to the JSCP.

(3) Friendly Nuclear Strike Warning. Friendly forces must receive advanced

warning of friendly nuclear strikes. This allows them to take actions to protect

themselves from the effects of the attack. In theater operations, the commander ordering

the strike issues the initial warning to subordinate headquarters whose units are likely to

be affected by the strike. Geographic combatant commands must develop procedures to

ensure multinational forces receive warning if they are likely to be affected by the effects

of US nuclear strikes. Commanders must ensure that warning is given in enough time for

friendly units to take actions to limit their damages caused by a US use of nuclear

weapons.

(4) Adversary WMD Use. When formulating COAs, operation planning must

address the possibility that an adversary will use WMD. Planning should also evaluate

nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defensive measures. Joint Publication (JP) 3-11,

Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Environments,

and JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, provide

additional guidance. The combatant commander must consider the adversary’s WMD

and delivery system capability when considering COAs. If the adversary threat

capability assessment indicates a WMD potential, the campaign plan should address

active and passive defensive and offensive measures necessary to counter the potential

use of such weapons and provide guidance for defending against such a threat.

(5) Attrition and Escalation. Nuclear or conventional warfare may result in

attrition of nuclear forces and supporting systems which could negatively affect nuclear

employment. If this attrition results in a radical change in the strategic force posture by

eliminating intermediate retaliatory steps, escalation is possible. Thus the ability to

precisely gauge the attrition of conventional and nuclear forces directly affects the

decision processes for both escalation to and termination of nuclear warfare.

(6) Nuclear Effects. The immediate and prolonged effects of nuclear weapons

including blast (overpressure, dynamic pressure, ground shock, and cratering), thermal

radiation (fire and other material effects), and nuclear radiation (initial, residual, fallout,

blackout, and electromagnetic pulse), impose physical and psychological challenges for

combat forces and noncombatant populations alike. These effects also pose significant

survivability requirements on military equipment, supporting civilian infrastructure

resources, and host-nation/coalition assets. US forces must prepare to survive and

perhaps operate in a nuclear/radiological environment. Commanders and military

planners must contend with significant challenges in a nuclear/radiological environment

and incorporate mitigating or avoidance measures into operation planning.

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(7) Mitigation. Actions required to mitigate the effects of WMD are shown in

Figure I-6.

c. Post Wartime Considerations (see Figure I-7).

(1) War Termination. Although the development and implementation of broad

war termination objectives are discussed in JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, the

differences between wholly conventional conflicts and nuclear conflicts are worthy of

examination. In the case of a global nuclear conflict, an intense exchange may limit the

pool of available negotiators, especially if leaders have been targeted. In many

foreseeable cases, however, nuclear weapons might only be used in coordination with

conventional forces, with the intent to coerce war termination from the opponent.

Depending on the scope and intensity of a conflict involving nuclear weapons, the

termination conditions may differ from solely conventional conflicts. The war

termination phase may initially involve the end of nuclear combat actions, but not

necessarily all aspects of conventional warfighting.

(2) Termination Strategy. The objective of a termination strategy is to end a

conflict with the least amount of destruction, while attaining national objectives. It is

fundamentally important to understand that termination of operations must be consistent

with national security strategy, national military strategy, and end state goals. However,

there are no assurances that a conflict involving WMD would be controllable or of short

duration. Indeed, it may be essential to ensure that an adversary is unable to rearm

expended delivery systems. Therefore, US nuclear forces and supporting C4ISR systems

must be survivable, redundant, secure, and safe to ensure their survival and deny

adversary war aims.

(3) Reserve Nuclear Forces. Retaining an adequate reserve of nuclear forces

should preclude another country or nonstate actor from coercing the United States before,

MITIGATION

Planning and warning, in conjunction with systematic, precautionary survivability

measures (such as dispersal of vital combat and support assets, increased force

mobility, concealment, deception, individual protective measures, and nuclear

hardening) can reduce the physical and psychological trauma.

Partially offset long-term degradation of effectiveness produced by WMD warfare

through comprehensive force training, preconditioning, and protection.

Establish and carefully assess operating procedures to avoid disproportionate or

unacceptable loss of personnel, units, or equipment and to ensure continuity of

operations during the initial and subsequent phases of a conflict involving WMD.

Mitigation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) effects, and at least partial

preservation of the operational and functional capabilities of people and equipment,

requires the following specific actions be taken by commanders:

Figure I-6. Mitigation

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during, or after the use of nuclear weapons. Such forces provide the United States with

the capability to continue nuclear deterrence, deny adversary war aims, exert leverage for

war termination, dissuade potential adversaries from action, and assure allies.

(4) Consequence Management (CM). JP 1-02, Department of Defense

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines CM as “Those measures taken to

protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide

emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the

consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation.”

The effects of nuclear weapons mandate that commanders plan for operations in the

postnuclear environment.

(5) Transition to Post-conflict Operations. Conflict termination operations

should establish the basis for post-conflict operations that assure accomplishment of US

long-term objectives in the region. To the degree that US forces and personnel are

integral to post-conflict operations, planning for the transition should emphasize

continuity across all relevant tasks, consistent with redeployment requirements

Additional doctrine relating to consequence management and post-conflict operations is

in JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)

Environments.

POST WARTIME CONSIDERATIONS

War termination

Termination strategy

Reserve nuclear forces

Consequence management

Transition to post-conflict operations

Figure I-7. Post Wartime Considerations

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II-1

CHAPTER II

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

The critical elements of strategic and theater nuclear operations include detailed

command relationships, command responsibilities, and C2 actions; integrated planning

and targeting; employment and force integration; and combat readiness. (see Figure II-1)

2. Command Relationships, Command and Control, and Command

Responsibilities

a. Command Relationships. National policy requires a single execution and

termination authority for the use of nuclear weapons. The President retains sole authority

for the employment and termination of nuclear weapons. The President’s decision to

“It is a doctrine of war not to assume the enemy will not come, but rather to rely

on one’s readiness to meet him; not to presume that he will not attack, but rather

to make one’s self invincible.”

Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Nuclear

Operations

Command

Relationships,

Command and

Control, and

Command

Responsibilities

Integrated

Planning

and

Targeting

Combat

Readiness

Employment

and Force

Integration

CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

Figure II-1. Critical Elements of Nuclear Operations

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authorize the release of nuclear weapons is based on the recommendations of the

Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and

allies. This authority is exercised through a single chain of command that runs from the

President to the Secretary of Defense directly to the combatant commanders. Nuclear

weapon orders are transmitted from the President and Secretary of Defense via the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with established procedures.

b. Command and Control. The pace of modern war dictates streamlined and

efficient methods of C2. The President and Secretary of Defense must have the most

current and available situational information and intelligence and must comprehend all

strategic and theater nuclear plans and options. Top-down communication transmitted

over reliable, secure, and survivable communications systems ensures critical orders are

received for execution, increases survivability, and reduces vulnerability of C2 systems

across the range of military operations.

c. Command Responsibilities.

The Commander, US Strategic Command

(CDRUSSTRATCOM), has combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over

selected portions of the nation’s strategic nuclear forces and is responsible for the

planning and execution of strategic nuclear operations. Circumstantially, geographic

combatant commanders may be assigned operational control (OPCON) over United

States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) nuclear-capable forces employed for

nuclear operations in support of theater conflicts. Theater nuclear operations are

discussed in further detail in Chapter III, “Theater Nuclear Operations.”

Nuclear weapon planning and execution guidance ensures optimal targeting

and synchronization of US nuclear forces.

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3. Integrated Planning and Targeting

a. Strategic Nuclear Planning. Detailed planning is key to the execution of

strategic nuclear operations. The President, Secretary of State, and Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff each provide guidance for nuclear weapon planning. This guidance

ensures optimal targeting and integration of US nuclear and conventional forces prior to,

during, and after conflict. CDRUSSTRATCOM uses this framework to develop plans;

and detailed mission planning is coordinated with standing task force commanders of all

strategic nuclear forces and US nuclearcapable allies.

(1) Integrated Operational Planning and Preplanned Options. An integrated

operation plan (OPLAN) or series of plans predicated on commonly agreed strategic

objectives is an absolute prerequisite to unity of force and strategic nuclear operations

execution. This plan or series of plans formalizes the integration of nuclear assets. They

clarify command guidance and objectives, effectively assign and prioritize targets, and

synchronize execution.

(2) Adaptive Planning. Strategic operational planning must include the ability

to respond to new targets and changing priorities before or during the execution of

strategic nuclear operations. This adaptive planning capability ensures the most efficient

use of resources and that strategic forces are fully capable of responding to any new

threats that might arise.

(3) Crisis Action Planning. Strategic planners must also be prepared to

conduct crisis action planning in those cases where adaptable, deliberate plans do not

exist.

b. Theater Nuclear Planning.

Theater-specific planning and targeting

considerations are addressed in JP 3-12.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

Theater Nuclear Planning (S).

c. Targeting. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and

matching the appropriate response to them, taking into account operational requirements

and capabilities. As nonnuclear strike capabilities and nuclear strike are integrated,

targets that may have required a nuclear weapon to achieve the needed effects in previous

planning may be targeted with conventional weapons, provided the required effects can

be achieved. Nuclear targeting decisions must also consider environmental considerations

and impacts in accordance with JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, JP 3-34, Engineer

Doctrine for Joint Operations, and JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.

Environmental considerations will probably be most relevant as elements of collateral

damage, since the environment falls short of most, if not all, of the criteria associated

with legal targets. JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, addresses the myriad factors

associated with the targeting process.

(1) Nuclear Targeting Process. Whether supporting national strategic goals or

geographic combatant commanders, the nuclear targeting process is cyclical. The

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process begins with guidance and priorities issued by the President, Secretary of Defense,

and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and culminates with the final step of combat

assessment. The entire targeting process consists of six phases as depicted in Figure II-2.

(a) Commander’s Objectives, Guidance, and Intent. Guidance and

objectives from the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff initiate the targeting cycle. CDRUSSTRATCOM provides additional targeting

guidance for strategic planning, while geographic combatant commanders, subordinate

joint force commanders, and component commanders provide additional guidance for

theater nuclear planning.

(b) Target Development, Validation, Nomination, and Prioritization.

The net result of target development is to produce a target nomination list that identifies

appropriate elements within an adversary’s power base (e.g., forces, infrastructure, and

political support) for attack. Successful attacks against these targets should closely

support US objectives.

translated into weapon recommendations. Targeting personnel translate the commander’s

guidance on desired effects into weapon recommendations as a result of capabilities

Commander’s

Objectives,

Guidance, and

Intent

Commander's

Decision and

Force

Assignment

Combat

Assessment

Mission

Planning and

Force

Target

Development,

Validation,

Nomination,

and

Capabilities

Analysis

JOINT TARGETING CYCLE PHASES

Figure II-2. Joint Targeting Cycle Phases

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analysis, which includes quantification of the expected results, consequences of

execution, and calculated desired ground zeros based on targeting intelligence.

(d) Commander’s Decision and Force Assignment. Targets are matched

to specific weapon systems, integrating the results of previous planning phases.

(e) Mission Planning and Force Execution. This phase includes

preparation and transmission of the final tasking order, specific mission planning and

material preparation at the unit level, Presidential authorization for use, and execution.

(f) Combat Assessment. In the final phase, the commander determines

whether the achieved target effects are consistent with either the strategic or the theater

campaign objectives. Combat assessment is composed of three interrelated components:

battle damage assessment, munitions effectiveness assessment, and reattack

recommendation.

Additional information on targeting can be found in JP 2-01.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques,

and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Targeting, and JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for

Targeting.

(2) Nuclear Targeting Planning Considerations. Several strategies or factors

are considered in planning nuclear operations (see Figure II-3). Theater-specific

targeting considerations are addressed in JP 3-12.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning (S).

(a) Nuclear Targeting. Nuclear targeting seeks to hold at risk those things

upon which a potential adversary places a high value as it pursues its interests, and which

support the accomplishment of US objectives. These include those critical war-making

and war-supporting assets and capabilities that a potential adversary leadership values

most and that it would rely on to achieve its own objectives. They may include military

forces, military bases of operation, infrastructure supporting those forces; C2 systems and

nodes, and WMD storage facilities, delivery systems and deployment sites.

TARGET PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Nuclear Targeting

Prioritization of Targets

Layering

Cross-targeting

Deliberate Planning

Adaptive Planning

Crisis Action Planning

Nuclear Collateral Damage

Damage Criteria

Figure II-3. Target Planning Considerations

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(b) Prioritization of Targets. Strategic nuclear targets are normally prioritized

based upon the overall targeting strategy. Further refinement of target priorities occurs

within each target category (e.g., industrial, military, energy facilities, storage facilities,

and weapon storage areas) based on the operational situation and the objectives

established by the appropriate command authority. Targets are not normally prioritized

during the theater nuclear planning process. Theater nuclear targets are included in the

theater nuclear option (TNO) and provide the geographic combatant commander and the

President a range of nuclear options to choose from depending upon theater conditions.

Prioritization may change as the war/campaign progresses.

Layering is a target defeat mechanism used by

USSTRATCOM. In layering, more than one weapon is planned against a target to

increase the probability of the target’s destruction; or to improve the confidence that a

weapon will arrive and detonate in the right location, and achieve the required level of

damage.

(d) Cross-targeting. Cross-targeting is a type of “layering” using different

platforms for employment against one target to increase the probability of at least one

weapon arriving at that target. Using different delivery platforms such as ICBMs,

SLBMs, or aircraftdelivered weapons increases the probability of achieving the desired

damage or target coverage.

(e) Planning. JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, sets forth the

fundamental principles and doctrine that guide planning by the Armed Forces of the

United States in joint or multinational operations. Additional guidance is available in

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and

Execution System Vol I (Planning Policies and Procedures); and CJCS emergency action

procedures. The following paragraphs focus on the unique aspects of nuclear planning.

1. Deliberate Planning. Deliberate planning is a highly structured

process that engages commanders and staffs of the entire joint planning and execution

community in the methodical development of fully coordinated, complex planning for

nuclear contingencies. The deliberately developed nuclear plans and options provide the

President, Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders with the capability to

rapidly respond to preplanned contingencies. Plans and options developed during

deliberate planning provide a foundation for adaptive planning.

2. Crisis Action Planning. The time-sensitive development of joint

operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning

follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective

response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. It is distinct from adaptive

planning in that emerging targets are likely to have no preexisting plans that could be

adapted. Success in engaging these types of targets depends heavily upon the speed with

which they are identified, targeted, and attacked.

3. Adaptive Planning. Within the context of nuclear operations,

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adaptive planning is a subset of crisis action planning. In adaptive planning, a deliberate

plan of sufficient similarity to the developing crisis already exists and can be changed to

meet national needs. Adaptive planning must synchronize emergent target attacks with

existing force employment plans.

(f) Nuclear Collateral Damage

1. Collateral damage can be described as the unintentional or incidental

injury or damage to persons or objects that would not normally be considered lawful

military targets. As with collateral damage arising from the use of conventional

weapons, such damage is not unlawful so long as the anticipated loss of life and damage

to property incidental to the use of force is not excessive in relation to the concrete and

direct military advantage expected to be gained by the attack.

2. Commanders and staffs responsible for developing nuclear plans

must strive to minimize collateral damage as they develop strike options and targeting

strategies. Specific techniques for reducing nuclear collateral damage may include lower

yield weapons, improving accuracy, employing multiple smaller weapons, adjusting the

height of burst, and offsetting the desired ground zero. As the advanced conventional

capabilities of the new triad are developed, the reliance on nuclear weapons to achieve

the required effects will be reduced. Consequently, anticipated nuclear collateral damage

will be reduced. CJSCI 3110.04B, Nuclear Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities

Plan (TSU), provides detailed requirements to minimize anticipated collateral damage

resulting from US use of nuclear weapons. Additionally, a detailed discussion of

techniques and collateral damage avoidance data is contained in JP 3-12.1, Joint Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning (S), forthcoming.

(g) Damage Criteria. Damage criteria are standards identifying specific

levels of destruction or material damage required for a particular target category. These

criteria are normally levied on the executing commander by higher authority in

accordance with national strategy and policy. Commanders must estimate the number

and characteristics of the weapons and delivery systems needed to achieve the required

level of damage to designated targets while minimizing collateral damage.

(3) Target Selection Factors

(a) Combatant commanders may consider the following target selection

factors to determine how to defeat individual targets. These factors may help determine

the appropriateness of a target for nuclear weapon employment as well as specific

weapon and delivery system selection. These factors are:

1. Time sensitivity.

2. Hardness (ability to withstand conventional strikes).

3. Size of target.

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4. Surrounding geology and depth (for underground targets).

5. Required level of damage.

6. Defenses.

7. Mobility.

8. Proximity to populated areas.

9. Potential for collateral damage.

(b) Considering these factors, possible adversary targets include:

1. WMD, associated delivery systems, C2, production, and logistic

support units.

2. Ground combat units, associated C2, and support units.

3. Air defense facilities and support installations.

4. Naval installations, combat vessels, associated support facilities, and

C2 capabilities.

5. Nonstate actors (their facilities and operation centers that possess

WMD).

6. Nuclear storage, nonnuclear storage, and hardened ICBM launch

facilities.

7. Political and military C2.

4. Employment and Force Integration

a. Force Integration

(1) Theater Nuclear Force Integration. See JP 3-12.1, Joint Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning (S), for guidance on theater

nuclear force integration.

(2) Conventional and Nuclear Force Integration. For many contingencies,

existing and emerging conventional capabilities will meet anticipated requirements;

however, some contingencies will remain where the most appropriate response may

include the use of US nuclear weapons. Integrating conventional and nuclear attacks will

ensure the most efficient use of force and provide US leaders with a broader range of

strike options to address immediate contingencies. Integration of conventional and

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nuclear forces is therefore crucial to the success of any comprehensive strategy. This

integration will ensure optimal targeting, minimal collateral damage, and reduce the

probability of escalation. As the OPLANs are developed, planners must articulate the

contribution to the overall strategy and describe how nuclear and conventional integration

will be achieved. To make the most efficient use of the nation’s strategic assets, to

maximize combat power, or to facilitate alliance or coalition action, strategic nuclear

operations may also be accomplished through the integration of US and allied nuclear

assets. Integration of forces exploits the full range of characteristics offered by US

nuclear forces to support national and regional objectives.

(a) Nuclear-capable aircraft offer a greater degree of flexibility in escalation

control because they may be a highly visible sign of resolve and, once ordered to conduct

a nuclear strike, are recallable, if necessary. Aircraft-delivered weapons also provide

strike capability across the range of nuclear operations.

(b) SLBM and ICBM forces offer the capability to strike high-priority

timesensitive targets. Fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) offer the added

characteristic of increased survivability due to their unpredictable location while

underway. As a sign of national resolve and readiness, SSBNs may be deployed.

nuclear and conventional attacks. These factors include:

1. Prelaunch survivability.

2. Weapon system reliability.

3. Circular error probable.

4. Weapon system performance characteristics.

5. Sortie separation criteria.

6. Adversary defense capabilities and limitations.

See associated definitions in the glossary and JP 3-12.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning (S), forthcoming.

(3) Offensive and Defensive Integration. Offensive and defensive force

integration is becoming increasingly important. Offensive and defensive forces are

becoming linked doctrinally and procedurally to achieve successful integration.

Defensive systems include space warning, air defense warning and interceptors, computer

network defense systems, ballistic missile defense warning, and worldwide integrated

tactical warning and attack assessment (ITW/ AA) systems. These systems, coupled with

additional passive defense measures, attempt to limit attack damage to US warfighting

capabilities and population. JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations,

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elaborates on the integration of offensive and defensive information operations

capabilities. Defensive forces can directly support offensive forces in five important

areas:

(a) In a national-level application, strategic defensive systems may improve

the US deterrence posture by increasing a potential adversary’s uncertainty of achieving

its attack objectives.

(b) In regional conflicts, missile defense offers some level of protection

against adversaries who have acquired ballistic missile technology. Although offense is

necessary for retaliation and conflict control, defense may also play an important,

complementary role in nonstrategic applications (e.g., irrational actor scenarios).

commander to consider employing offensive counterforce strikes while enhancing

security from catastrophic results if an adversary launches a retaliatory strike while under

attack.

(d) Early warning systems include an ITW/AA capability, providing the

President and Secretary of Defense with the means to maximize the survivability of US

and allied forces. Deterrence is enhanced because of the increased survivability of US

retaliatory forces and their associated C2.

(e) Air defenses also serve to enhance US deterrent capability by increasing

an adversary’s uncertainty that its weapon systems will strike their intended targets.

Ensuring the survivability of US retaliatory strike capability complicates the decision

processes of a potential adversary.

(4) Planning Considerations (see Figure II-4).

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Flight Corridors

Land, Air, Maritime, Space, and

Special Operations

Impact Point

Prediction Information

Decision Timelines

Defended Assets

and Adversary Targets

Command, Control, Communications,

Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Overflight

Figure II-4. Planning Considerations

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(a) Aircraft and Cruise Missile Flight Corridors. Flight corridors must

comply with international law governing airspace rights of non-hostile sovereign nations.

Because nuclear forces could simultaneously occupy the same flight corridors it is

imperative that flight corridors are deconflicted.

(b) Overflight. ICBM and SLBM flight corridors may traverse the territory

and airspace of other sovereign nations only when permitted under international law. As

a matter of national policy and pursuant to international law, the US respects the airspace

rights of nonhostile, sovereign nations.